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I. ARGUMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
A. Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) Is Ambiguous so the Court Should Look to Legislative 
History and Apply Rules of Statutory Interpretation to Determine the Legislature's 
Intent. 
A statute is not open to construction as a matter of course. It is open to 
construction only where the language used in the statute requires interpretation, 
that is, where the statute is ambiguous, or will bear two or more constructions, or 
is of such doubtful or obscure meaning, that reasonable minds might be uncertain 
or disagree as to its meaning. 
Hickman v. Lunden, 78 Idaho 191, 195,300 P.2d 818,820 (1956) (quoting 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, 
204, sec. 225»; see also State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d. 1183, 1187 (2007) 
(Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006) 
("If the language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable construction it is 
ambiguous ). 
Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) currently states: 
[A]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, 
delivery, receipt, possession or concealment, for the purpose of distribution or 
receipt of [controlled substances]. 
Idaho Code § 37-2477(a)(4) bears two or more constructions and is doubtful in meaning so that 
reasonable minds disagree as to its meaning. As evidence that this statutory provision bears two 
or more constructions and is doubtful in meaning so that reasonable minds disagree, the Fourth 
District Magistrate Court and the Fourth District Court came to different conclusions regarding 
its meaning. In addition, the courts of two other states, New Mexico and Tennessee, which once 
had similar statues, found it necessary to interpret the meaning of the statute. 
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In addition to the evidence that courts have already found it necessary to interpret the 
meaning of Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4), some recent decisions by this Court and the Court of 
Appeals offer examples of when a statute mayor may not be found to be ambiguous. An 
example of an unambiguous statute was recently provided in State v. Giovanelli, 152 Idaho 717, 
274 P.3d 18, 20. (Ct. Apps. 2012). Idaho Code § 18-8410 states: "[W]hen a registered 
juvenile sex offender reaches twenty-one (21) years of age, the prosecutor may petition the court 
to transfer the offender to the adult registry." 274 P.3d at 20. The Court noted that the statute is 
clear that "[0 Jnly when an offender reaches twenty-one may the prosecutor file a petition." Id. In 
Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 274 P.3d 1249 (2012), Arambarri argued that the 
language "[eJach substate administrative region shall be headed by a regional director" required 
seven regional directors, one for each of the seven administrative regions. This Court found that 
the plain language of Idaho Code § 56-1002(3) did not require a regional director for each 
region. Id. 
In contrast, Idaho courts appear to have found statutes ambiguous when the grammar of a 
statute is at issue. For example, in BHC Intermountain Hosp., Inc. v. Ada County, 150 Idaho 93, 
96, 244 P.3d 237, 239 (2010), the parties had differing opinions regarding what the phrase "in 
accordance with the provisions of chapter 35, title 31 Idaho Code" referenced. This Court 
utilized the last antecedent rule in interpreting the phrase, and found because the phrase was 
placed immediately after the phrase "the court shall fix responsibility" that "in accordance with 
the provisions of chapter 35, title 31" was limited to fixing responsibility. Id. at 96, 244 P.3 d 
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240. In State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 51 P.3d 443, (Ct. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals 
found it necessary to interpret Idaho Code § 18-4105(b). The statute stated: "'(b) An actual or 
simulated sex act, or sexual contact between humans and animals, or masturbation, or any 
graphic or pictorial display thereof; ... is guilty of a misdemeanor. ", Id. at 632, 51 P .3d at 446 
(quoting Idaho Code § 18-4105(b)). Paciorek argued that the adjective "simulated" only 
modified "sex act" according to the rules of grammar. The Court of Appeals found that 
utilization of grammar rules is a consideration; however, "ultimately our task is to interpret the 
statute not as a professor of English grammar would parse it but as the legislature intended 
it." Id. The Court found that simulated modified other nouns in the sentence. It appears from 
these recent decisions that when the words of a statute are clear, Idaho courts find statutes to be 
unambiguous; however, it appears that when differing interpretations result from grammar, the 
statutes are found to be ambiguous. Because the grammar in the statute at issue could lead to 
different interpretations, Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)( 4) should be found to be ambiguous. 
The Fourth District Magistrate Court and the Fourth District Court came to different 
conclusions regarding the meaning of Idaho Code § 37-2744 indicating reasonable minds 
disagree as to its meaning. In addition, courts with similar statutes to Idaho Code 
§ 37-2744(a)(4) have found it necessary to interpret the statute, indicating the statute will bear 
two or more constructions. Finally, it appears that when grammar obscures the meaning, it 
appears that a statute is ambiguous. Because Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) is ambiguous, 
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requiring interpretation, this Court should determine the intent of the Legislature by reviewing 
legislative history and engaging in statutory construction. 
1. The Legislative History of § 37-2744(a)(4) and § 37-2732(c) Indicates the 
Legislature Intended that a Conveyance Could Be Forfeited for Either the 
Transportation of Drugs or the Trafficking of Drugs. 
'Forfeiture' has been defined as the taking of property without compensation, 
because of an offense, when the taking has been 'deemed necessary by the 
legislature to restrain the commission of the offense and to aid in its prevention.' 
36 AM.JUR.2D Forfeiture, § 1, p. 611 (1968); Spooner, 520 So.2d at 357;1 One 
1988 Ford Coupe, 574A.2d at 6362. Forfeiture statutes impose an economic 
penalty by rendering the illegal behavior unprofitable, and deterring such behavior 
by preventing further illegal use of the property. 
Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement By and Through Richardson v. $34,000 Us. Currency, 121 
Idaho 211, 217, 824 P.2d 142, 148 (Ct. Apps. 1991). Rubey argues that the civil forfeiture 
statute, which "acts in rem against the seized property itself" should be construed against the 
Prosecuting Attorney and in favor of Rubey. State v. Key, 149 Idaho 691, 699, 239 P.3d 796, 
804 (Ct. Apps. 2010). He supports this argument with a lease case and two criminal cases from 
Idaho. Rubey's main citation3 is to page 284 of State v. Nunez, 2 P.3d 264 (N.M. 1999). On 
page 284 of the Nunez opinion, the New Mexico Court finds civil forfeiture punitive for 
1 State v. Spooner, 520 So.2d 336 (La. 1988). 
2 Commonwealth v. One 1988 Ford Coupe, 574 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1990). 
3 Rubey offers several other citations, including one from the federal district court in Texas. 
Although the U.S. District Court in Texas did state that statutes are to be strictly construed, the 
Court made the decision not to strictly construe the statute and allowed an untimely filing 
because the federal government had made a good faith effort to comply with the statute. Us. v. 
$39,480.00 in Us. Currency, 190 F.Supp.2nd 929, 933 (W. D. Tex. 2002). 
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double-jeopardy standards, and concludes the opinion by declining to follow the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996). Idaho, on the other 
hand has followed Ursery in State v. Ross, 129 Idaho 380, 381 n.l, 924 P.2d 1224, 1225 n.l 
(1996). Rubey's support is not persuasive that the civil forfeiture statute should be construed in 
favor of Rubey. The evidence that is persuasive are the actions of the Idaho Legislature enacting 
and amending the Uniformed Controlled Substances Act. Those actions, as outlined in the 
Prosecuting Attorney's opening Brief and in this Reply, indicate that the Legislature has 
expanded the forfeiture provisions rather than restricted those provisions.4 
Claimant Ruby agrees with the Prosecuting Attorney that until 1990, there was an 
exemption for the forfeiture of vehicles for misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. 
Respondent's Brief at 15. As argued in the Prosecuting Attorney's opening brief, this exemption 
was only necessary if the verb "to transport" in Idaho Code § 37-27 44( a)( 4) is separate from the 
verb "to facilitate" and its modifying language "for the purpose of distribution or receipt." If the 
forfeiture of vehicles can only occur when there is trafficking, as Rubey argues, then there would 
have been no need for the specific misdemeanor possession exemption when the law was 
enacted. The repeal of the exemption in 1990 left in place a statute that allows for the forfeiture 
of conveyances that are transporting controlled substances, as well as an allowance for the 
forfeiture of vehicles that are facilitating the transportation of controlled substances for the 
4 In addition, the Legislature amended the statute in 1986 to allow for the forfeiture of currency 
that was in close proximity to a controlled substance. State of Idaho v. One 1977 Subaru Two 
Door, 114 Idaho 43,45, 753 P.2d 254, 256 n.1 (1988). 
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purpose of distribution and receipt. Statutory interpretation requires that effect be given to all 
words so that none are void or superfluous. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 
1183, 1187 (2007). The legislative history indicates that in order to give meaning to the verb "to 
transport," it must be read as a separate action from facilitating the transportation, delivery, 
receipt, possession or concealment for the purpose of sale or receipt of controlled substances. 
Rubey does not address the Prosecuting Attorney's argument regarding how the 
exemption affected the rest of the statute nor does he address the Legislature's specific focus on 
the word transportS during the legislative discussions and in amendments. Instead, Rubey puts 
his focus on the words misdemeanor and felony, and argues that "No question has been presented 
on this appeal concerning the civil forfeiture of a conveyance arising out of a misdemeanor 
5The 1972 Committee Minutes for RS 3734 [SB 1467] state: "Subparagraph (4), [], broadens the 
use of various vehicles or types of vehicles used in transporting drugs, which could result in 
forfeiture of the vehicle." Hearing on S.B. 1467 Before the Senate Judiciary and Rules Comm., 
41st Leg., 2nd Sess. (Feb. 9, 1972) (explanation ofMr. Martin Ward, Office of Attorney General) 
(emphasis added). The Legislature also amended subsection B of § 37-2744(a)(4) to provide: 
"no conveyance is subject to forfeiture under this section if the owner establishes that he could 
not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that the conveyance was being used to 
unlawfully transport"S controlled substances. S.B. 1467, 41st Leg., 2nd Sess., 1972u Idaho 
Session Laws 277 (emphasis added). 
The Committee Minutes for RS 23871 [HB 640] in 1990 state: "Because of an oversight, the 
present statute states that if LSD is being transported, the conveyance is not subject to forfeiture. 
This new legislation would correct this." Hearing on RS 23871 Before the House Judiciary, 
Rules & Administrative Comm., Centennial Leg., 2nd Sess. (Feb. 13, 1990) (emphasis in 
original). In the Senate Committee, the Minutes for House Bill 640 state: "HB 640 would 
repeal the section of the forfeiture law that immunizes a person transporting LSD from forfeiture 
of his or her conveyance." Hearing on HB. 640 Before the Senate Judiciary and Rules Comm., 
Centennial Leg., 2nd Sess. (Mar. 19, 1990) (emphasis added). 
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conviction." Respondent's Brief at 15. This is not an argument about misdemeanors and 
felonies, but as stated above, is how the exemption that once existed in Idaho Code 
§ 37-2744(a)(4) and has since been repealed, and other legislative discussions and amendments 
all assist in interpreting Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4). The exemption, its repeal, other 
amendments and legislative discussions all indicate that the "mere" possession of 
methamphetamine and its transportation result in the forfeiture of the conveyance. 
2. The Grammatical Structure of Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) Indicates that 
"for purposes of distribution and receipt" Does Not Modify the Verb "to 
transport." 
The last antecedent rule, as interpreted by this Court and the Court of Appeals indicates 
that the phrase "for purpose of distribution or receipt of' references "or in any manner to 
facilitate the transportation, delivery, receipt, possession or concealment" of methamphetamine. 
In BRC Intermountain Hasp., v. Ada County, 150 Idaho 93, 244 P.3d 237 (2010), this Court 
interpreted the following sentence from Idaho Code § 66-327: 
If the court determines such person is unable to pay all or any part of such costs, 
the court shall fix responsibility, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 35, 
title 31 Idaho Code, for payment of such costs on the county of such person's 
residence to the extent not paid by such person or not covered by third party 
resources, including medical assistance as aforesaid. 
This Court determined that the phrase "in accordance with the provisions of chapter 35, title 31 
Idaho Code" referred only to shall fix responsibility because "[ u ]nder the rule of the last 
antecedent clause, a referential or qualifying clause refers solely to the last antecedent, absent a 
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showing of contrary intent." Id. at 96, 244 P.3d at 240 (citing Myer v. Ada Cnty., 50 Idaho 39, 
42,293 P. 322, 323 (1930)). 
In Rubey's Brief, he cites to State v. Troughton, 126 Idaho 406, 888 P.2d 419 (Ct. App. 
1994) as support for his argument that the statutory phrase "for the purpose of distribution or 
receipt of' is applicable to transport. The Prosecuting Attorney believes Troughton, like EHe 
Intermountain Hospital, supports a finding that "for the purpose of distribution or receipt of' is 
not applicable to "to transport." At issue in Troughton was the following phrase from the 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act: "which contains any quantity of the following substances 
having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system." !d. at 411,888 P.2d at 424; Idaho Code 
§ 37-2707. Troughton argued that "having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system" 
referred to quantity. Id. at 410, 888 P.2d at 423. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district 
court that "having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system" modified substances and not 
quantity. Id. at 411, 888 P.2d at 424. In making its decision, the Court of Appeals cited to 
language from a Nebraska case: "Under this rule, known as the rule of the last antecedent clause, 
a referential or qualifYing phrase refers solely to the last antecedent, absent a showing of contrary 
intent." Id. (citing State v. Jennings, 195 Neb. 434,238 N.W.2d 477, 481 (1976)). 
Rubey has not provided any proof of any contrary intent by the Idaho Legislature. The 
Prosecuting Attorney, on the other hand, has shown the intent of the Legislature to make a 
vehicle subject to forfeiture for transporting a controlled substance. Without a showing of 
contrary legislative intent, the phrase "for the purpose of distribution or receipt of' refers solely 
- 8 -
to the last antecedent "or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, delivery, receipt, 
possession or concealment." 
3. Federal Law, on Which Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) Was Based, Indicates 
that the Transportation of Controlled Substances Is Separate from 
Facilitating the Transportation for the Purpose of Distribution or Receipt of 
Controlled Substances. 
The original federal statute (21 U.S.C. § 881) provided in relevant part: 
All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, 
sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), 
(2), or (9). 
R. at 437. The original Idaho statute is very similar to the original federal statute and states: 
[A]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for 
the purpose of sale or receipt of [controlled substances]. 
H.B. 261, Idaho Code § 37-2477(a)(4) (1971). Rubey argues that the federal statute does not 
contain the phrase "for the purpose of distribution or receipt" and thus offers little assistance in 
construing the statute. Respondent's Brief at 23. The original federal statute did not need the 
phrase "for the purpose of distribution or receipt" because the statute provided a vehicle could be 
forfeited if used "in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or 
concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9)" (emphasis added). Idaho's initial 
- 9-
statute had the phrase "for the purpose of sale or receipt of' because facilitation was limited to 
transportation.6 
In State v. Stevens, 139 Idaho 670, 675, 84 P.3d 1038, 1043 (Ct. App. 2004), the Court of 
Appeals noted that the district court had relied heavily on federal case law involving civil 
forfeiture proceedings in making its forfeiture determination. The Court of Appeals further noted 
that 21 U.S.c. § 881 was similar to Idaho Code § 37-2744[a](4) and "[h]ad the prosecutor 
pursued civil forfeiture, the federal cases upon which the district court relied would be persuasive 
and the result of this appeal would likely be different." Id. The federal cases that the district 
court relied on were United States v. 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. One 1986 Ford Pickup, Ca. License No. 2W03753, VIN 2FTJW36L6GCA99688, 56 
F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lewis, 987 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 
709 F.2d 1424 (l1th Cir. 1983); United States v. One 1977 Cadillac Coupe Deville, 644 F.2d 500 
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 
1977). Brief of Respondent, Appendix 2 (Memorandum Decision Re: Forfeiture Request), State 
of Idaho v. Patrick A. Stevens, (In the Supreme Court ofthe State ofIdaho 2002) (No. 29057). 
6 In 1972, the Legislature amended the statute to add "delivery, receipt, possession or 
concealment" to facilitate and changed sale to distribution. 
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Although the federal cases were cited by the Patrick A. Stevens' District Court in support 
of facilitation, specifically transporting a person to a drug transaction, some of the cases are also 
instructive regarding "to transport." In 1990 Toyota 4Runner, the Seventh Circuit stated: "A 
vehicle or other conveyance used to transport the drugs is forfeitable by virtue of the 'to 
transport' clause." 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F.3d at 652. The Seventh Circuit also analyzed the 
legislative history of the federal statute and noted that the transport clause was specifically 
mentioned. Id. at 653 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1444, 91 st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at p. 55 (1970)). 
The Ninth Circuit noted: "Our vehicle forfeiture statutes do establish some general rules. It is 
not necessary that the vehicle actually be used to transport drugs; use of a vehicle to transport 
purchase money to the site of a drug sale subjects the vehicle to forfeiture." One 1986 Ford, 65 
F.3d at 1187 n.7 (citing United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also One 
1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d at 1427. The Second Circuit has found it would be nonsensical 
that a vehicle could be forfeited for transporting minute quantities of drugs but could not be 
forfeited if the vehicle was used to get a person to a drug sale. One 1974 Cadillac, 548 F.2d at 
435. 
The federal courts' interpretation of the federal statute is that "to transport" a controlled 
substance is a separate action from "in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, 
possession, or concealment." Since the purpose of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in 
Idaho in 1971 was to conform Idaho's drug laws with federal drug laws, the federal courts' 
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decisions offer persuasive evidence that transporting methamphetamine subjects a vehicle to 
forfeiture. 
4. Tennessee and New Mexico, States with Similar Conveyance Forfeiture 
Statutes, Have Interpreted the Statute as to Transport Being a Separate 
Action from Facilitating the Transportation for the Purpose of Distribution 
and Receipt. 
At the time the Tennessee Court of Appeals and the New Mexico Court of Appeals 
interpreted their civil forfeiture conveyance statutes, the statutes were nearly identical to Idaho's 
civil forfeiture conveyance statute. Because the Idaho forfeiture statute contains a uniformity of 
interpretation provision,7 and because Idaho Courts have not yet interpreted Idaho Code 
§ 37-2744(a)(4), the decisions by other state courts with similar provisions offer persuasive 
authority. In 1985 when the Tennessee Court of Appeals interpreted its conveyance statute in 
Featherston v. Wood, WL 4551 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1985),8 the statute, including its 
punctuation, read as follows: 
[A]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any marmer to facilitate the transportation, for 
the purpose of the sale or receipt of [controlled substances]. 
7 Idaho Code § 37-2750; State v. Barraza-Martinez, 139 Idaho 624, 626, 84 P.3d 560, 562 
(2003). 
8 Featherston v. Wood is quoted as a Court of Appeals Opinion in Hughes v. State Dept. of 
Safety, 776 S.W.2d 111, 112-13, (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). 
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Tennessee Code Annotated § 53-11-409(a)(4) (1978) (emphasis added). Idaho's statute in 19719 
read, including punctuation, read as follows: 
[A]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for 
the purpose of sale or receipt of [controlled substances]. 
H.B. 261, Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) (1971) (emphasis added). The Tennessee statute, like the 
Idaho statute, had two verbs: "to transport" and "to facilitate." According to the Tennessee 
Court's interpretation, the phrase "for the purpose of sale or receipt" does not modify the verb "to 
facilitate" but rather modifies the noun "transportation" that follows the verb "to facilitate." 
Featherstone v. Wood, 1985 WL 4551, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1985); Hughes v. State 
Dept. of Safety, 776 S.W.2d 111, 112-113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). If the phrase does not modify 
the verb "to facilitate," then it cannot be read to modify the verb "to transport" which occurs 
earlier in the statute. 
Rubey points out that the Tennessee Legislature repealed the statute after the 
Featherstone decision to bring the Tennessee statute in line with the federal statute. That may be 
true; however, it is not relevant to how the Tennessee Court of Appeals interpreted its statute. At 
the time of the Featherstone decision, the Tennessee statute was almost identical to the Idaho 
9 The Legislature amended the statute in 1972 adding: [A]ll conveyances, including aircraft, 
vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to 
facilitate the transportation, delivery, receipt, possession or concealment, for the purpose of sale 
or receipt of [controlled substances]. H.B. 627 
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statute. The Tennessee Court of Appeals interpreted that statute in a manner where transporting 
a controlled substance is sufficient for the conveyance to be forfeited. 
New Mexico also had a similar provision in its early forfeiture statute. New Mexico's 
prior statute, including its punctuation, was nearly identical to the Idaho civil forfeiture statute. 
The 1978 New Mexico statute stated: 
[A]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used, or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for 
the purpose of the sale of [controlled substances]. 
New Mexico Statutes Annotated § 30-31-34 (1978). In interpreting the New Mexico statute, the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico found that "transportation need not be for the purpose of sale." 
Matter of Forfeiture, 673 P.2d 1310, 1312 (N.M. 1983). New Mexico then amended the statute 
and removed three commas so it read: 
[A]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used or 
intended for use to transport or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for 
the purpose of the sale of [controlled substances]. 
State ex ref. Dept. of Public Safety v. Oretega, 857 P.2d 44 (N.M. 1993) (quoting New Mexico 
Statutes Annotated § 30-31-34(D). In Ortega, the Court noted that the comma after the verb "to 
transport" had been removed, applied "a less technical version of the 'last antecedent rule, '" and 
found forfeiture of a conveyance was allowed only when transportation occurred for the purpose 
of sale of a controlled substance. Id. at 47-48. Idaho's statute still has a comma after the verb 
"to transport," thus the Matter of Forfeiture decision is persuasive that trafficking is not required 
for a vehicle to be forfeited. 
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B. The Decision in Key Supports Civil Forfeiture of Conveyances, Such as Motorcycles, 
U sed to Transport Methamphetamine. 
Rubey frames the issue in this case as "whether that statute [37-2744(a)(4)] can be 
construed to allow for civil forfeiture arising out of nothing more than an offense based upon 
mere [felony] possession." Respondent's Brief at 6. A finding that there cannot be a civil 
forfeiture of a vehicle based upon "mere" possession would lead to an absurd result. Ginger 
Key's car was forfeited based upon "mere" possession. State of Idaho v. Key, 149 Idaho 691, 
239 P.3d 796 (Ct. App. 2010). As outlined in the Prosecuting Attorney's opening Brief, the only 
difference between this case and Key, is that in Key the forfeiture action for the conveyance was 
brought under the criminal forfeiture provision, rather than the civil forfeiture provision. 
Interpreting Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) as requiring trafficking for a civil forfeiture proceeding 
while "mere" possession is sufficient for a criminal forfeiture proceeding leads to an absurd 
result. There is no evidence in the legislative history that the Idaho Legislature intended the civil 
forfeiture procedure to be more stringent than the criminal forfeiture procedure. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Because reasonable minds can disagree regarding the meaning of Idaho Code 
§ 37-2744(a)(4), it is ambiguous. When a statute is ambiguous, this Court determines the intent 
of the Idaho Legislature. In the case of this particular statute, the task of determining the 
legislative intent is easier because there is a documented history. That history indicates an intent 
by the Idaho Legislature to allow the forfeiture of conveyances for transporting controlled 
substances. Coupled with the legislative intent is statutory construction, which also indicates that 
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the phrase "for the purpose of distribution or receipt of' does not reference to transport. Finally, 
federal case law, interpretations of similar statutes from other states and Idaho case law all 
support the interpretation that the Legislature intended the civil forfeiture of a conveyance when 
the conveyance is transporting controlled substances. 
DATED this 15th day of June, 2012. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Lo K. J orgel'Isen 
Dep6.ty Prosecuting Attorney 
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